李世默：这个百年，这个党
2013年11月，中国共产党十八届三中全会在北京召开。中国的领导权力交接一般在党的全国代表大会上完成，而新班子的施政蓝图则在三中全会上勾勒，其影响有时超过一代人。众所周知，1978年底，正是在十一届三中全会上，邓小平启动了历史性的经济改革。那届三中全会改变了中国的命运，甚至影响到了今天的世界格局。30多年后，中国已跃居世界第二大经济体，是当今世界公认的崛起中的大国。2012年，中共十八大完成领导层交接，而三中全会则呈现习近平总书记及其同事将如何谋篇布局，令全世界瞩目。
本届三中全会通过的经济改革决议内容非常丰富，吸引了大部分的注意力。已公布的新经济政策出乎大部分人的预期，仅举几项足以深刻影响中国经济结构的新政，比如推广国有企业的混合所有制，减少对企业的行政管制，改善有关农民、土地的管理、流转措施，促进金融领域市场化。如果这些举措能在相当程度上落实，中国经济无疑将再次迎来持续增长的新时代。
然而，主流舆论的评价依旧是，中国的新领导集体沿袭了先前的改革路径，即经济改革步伐很大，而备受期待的政治改革却停滞不前，甚至有所倒退。毋庸置疑，本届三中全会加强了中共在中国政治体制内的领导地位。因此，有些人断言新领导集体在走“政左经右”的老套路。
但这种观点是偏执的误读。事实上，三中全会启动了许多关键的，甚至是划时代的政治改革。这些改革将根本上改变这个世界人口最多的国家的治理模式。
至少在以下三大重要领域，制度性的改革已经展开。具体而言，包括：一、重新调整中央与地方的关系；二、划时代地革新党和国家的纪检司法制度；三、建国以来最大幅度重组最高领导层的决策机制，与时俱进，重新定义党政关系。
财政预算改革
中央与地方的关系一直是中国政治的难题，几千年来一直困扰着中华帝国。这一对关系处理得当与否，直接关乎社稷兴亡。处理得当，则国泰民安；反之，则内乱频仍，甚至导致皇朝的衰落和灭亡。
当代中国也不例外。建国64年来，在中央与地方关系上，中共至少经历了三个阶段的探索：第一阶段是1949年至1956年，当时为了巩固新生的共和国，恢复满目疮痍的国民经济，中国引进苏联体制，将几乎一切权力收归中央；但在第二阶段，也就是50年代末开始，新中国的缔造者毛泽东反思苏联体制，在相当长时间里推动了权力下放的改革。这一大胆探索的理论思考，集中体现于1956年毛泽东论述治国方针的重要著作《论十大关系》。在其中，毛泽东主张将权力大幅从中央下放到省和基层。毛泽东阐述，权力下放有利于解放生产力，调动地方的政治积极性。这一权力下放变革在“文化大革命”结束时的70年代末达到高峰，包括征税、国企管理甚至军队工作都移交到地方。这一趋势一直延续到改革开放初期，在80年代，中央政府多次陷入财政困境，不得不向各省“化缘”。很多人将毛泽东视为集权主义者，这一观点其实是过于简单化的。
直到90年代初，中国才开始重新调整中央与地方的关系。1994年，朱镕基启动分税制改革，充实中央财政。然而，近30年放权让利的趋势积重难返。截止到十八届三中全会前，中央政府的年税收收入达20万亿元，但仅有一半列入财政预算。三中全会宣布，中国将完善国家财政制度，统一收入和支出，这无疑切准了几十年来中央与地方关系的核心。这项改革完成后，中央控制支出的能力将大大增加；央地间的权责关系将更加明晰；转移支付管理将进一步标准化；地方债的监督管理将归总到中央部委。
未来十年，这些改革将强劲推动中国的全方位发展。税收管理系统和地方债务控制机制的改革，将纠正过度追求短期和局部经济目标导致的资源配置不合理。央地关系调整后，中央将会立足于全国高度，对国家长期发展战略进行布局。城市化无疑是重中之重。中国计划在未来20年里，以年均1300万人的速度推动城市化。在此前的发展模式中，城乡差距越拉越大，和进城农民工边缘化等问题久拖不决。随着中央财政支出能力增强，政府将会改善资源配置方式，增加医疗、福利、教育等公共品的供给。中国要在下一阶段实现其雄心勃勃的城市化目标，这些改革是极为必要的。
三中全会决议中最受关注的一项政策表述，是发挥市场在资源配置中的决定性作用。一些人认为，这一改革目标可能与央地关系调整中中央权力加强的导向矛盾。这种分析不符合事实。30多年来，相对分散放权的制度环境促进了经济发展，也导致了商业竞争中地方保护主义盛行和制度化规则缺失，这无疑妨碍了市场经济的深化发展。许多企业利用与地方政府的特殊关系，设置行政壁垒，阻碍其它地区的竞争者进入。许多企业赴外地发展时，都会遭遇规章、管理上的重重障碍。正如美国工业化时期联邦权力的不断加强促进了国内贸易，三中全会启动的改革也将提高中国市场经济的活力并扩大其规模效应。除此之外，这一改革还会带来许多外部收益。比如，全国范围内统一标准、改进规章、加强监管，将极大地促进环境保护和食品安全。
纪检司法改革
腐败泛滥是当前中国政府治理面临的主要挑战。很多人断言，尽管中国模式在其他领域的成绩称得上无可否认，但终究克服不了腐败这个阿喀琉斯之踵。近年来中共难以遏制腐败的主要原因之一是，党和政府的纪检司法制度存在根本性缺陷。
中共自从诞生起，就十分注重对党内权力滥用的监督。1927年，早在获得政权22年前，即正式成立仅6年后，中共就建立了第一个党内监督机构——中央监察委员会。在建国后64年的革命和执政过程中，党内监督机构的作用历经波折，到“文革”时期已完全失效。在1978年的十一届三中全会上，邓小平领导重建党内监督机构，即中央纪律检查委员会。
从1927年起，中共沿用了源自苏共的矩阵式结构的党内监督制度。名义上，各级纪委在工作上都受其上级指导，且中纪委是最高的指导机构。但实际运行中，纪委在组织和工作上，都无法独立于同级党委。比如，在一个县里，最大的官员就是县委书记；县纪委书记也是县委常委，但其党内地位和级别却低于主持常委会工作的县委书记。进而言之，在人事、财政、工资、福利上，各级纪委莫不受控于同级党委。这就会引发许多困境，纪检官员必须监督比自己威望和权力大得多、甚至还能决定他仕途的领导。在政府结构相对简单时，这一缺陷尚不明显，但随着政治、社会结构高度发展且日渐复杂，上述结构性缺陷就足以损害党的执政能力。
重庆市委书记薄熙来在落马前，是中国最高决策层中央政治局的成员；但重庆市纪委书记，却连中央委员都不是，党内地位和权力与薄熙来相去甚远。因此毫不奇怪，纪委能惩戒较低级别的腐败分子，但对同级或更高级的违法分子就无能为力了。
三中全会对党内监督制度进行了划时代的改革。中共总结了近60年来纪检工作的经验，加强了纪委的垂直领导，使各级纪委决策权独立于同级党委。经过改革，各级纪委仍属同级党委成员，但在执行监督职能时独立决策。每一级纪委接受上一级纪委的直接指导，最后在管理上都归口到中央纪委。中央纪委获得了对全国各级纪检官员的人事权。各级纪委在立案查案时，将不受同级党委干预，对上级纪委负责。就在三中全会结束之际，中央纪委从北京向上海空降了一位纪委书记，这或许是在传递一个政治信号。
与中共党内监督制度的改革相对照，政府层面的司法改革也体现了同样的精神。各级法院将接受上级法院的指导，更少受同级政府的干预。下一步改革方向可能是设立跨行政区划的法院，以进一步减少来自地方政府的影响。
上述改革对中国未来治理的影响不可低估。这是几十年来中共对政治体制内权力分配的最大调整。中国是个幅员辽阔的大国，治理模式十分复杂。在各级政府中设立独立的监督机构，是一项巨大的变革。如果这一举措得到有效落实，将在相当程度上遏制腐败并改善政府治理能力。
本文发表于最新一期《外交》杂志（《Foreign Affairs》）及其网站，观察者网首发中文全文
党政关系改革
三中全会最引人注目的改革举措，是国家安全委员会和全面深化改革领导小组的设立。这两个机构都接受中央政治局以及其常委会的直接领导，这也就意味着其地位高于国务院，后者相当于西方国家的内阁。要理解这一举措的重要意义，首先要回溯一下建国以来的历史沿革。
1949年中华人民共和国成立时，从苏联引进了“三驾马车”的政治模式。在苏联，“三驾马车”是指苏共中央委员会、最高苏维埃、部长会议；与此相对应，中共在已有的中共中央委员会之外，又设立了全国人民代表大会和国务院。其中，全国人大是由其委员长领导下的立法机关，而国务院则是政府总理管理下的内阁，而人大委员长和政府总理又都是政治局常委。近二十年来，党的总书记也担任国家主席，也就是国家的元首。在形式上，“三驾马车”是并驾齐驱的，但中国宪法同时赋予中共最高领导地位。
由此可见，“三驾马车”在制度上导致叠床架屋，在政治上也有其不确定性。在党和政府的关系中，这一问题往往特别敏感。建国以后，关于究竟应该“党政合一”还是“党政分开”， 多次引发争论。在建国以后第一个三十年，毛泽东在到底是只做党的主席，放手让政府独立作为，还是干脆走上前台，党政军一把抓的问题上，反复权衡，一直举棋不定。“三驾马车”模式潜伏的制度性矛盾，以及当时多位建国领导人的特殊性格和地位，正是“文革”浩劫爆发的原因之一。
不论在宪法还是政治实践中，中共中央都是中国的最高决策机构。然而，“三驾马车”模式导致了形式上的权力分化。这种理论上的模糊，已成为中国政治发展的一大障碍。本届三中全会决定设立国家安全委员会和全面深化改革领导小组，为最终破除苏联政治模式的缺陷迈出了关键一步。通过加强宪法赋予的领导地位，中共正决然地走到政治领导的中心和前沿。国家安全委员会领导几乎一切攸关国内外安全问题的事务，从公安部到外交部皆涵盖其中。全面深化改革领导小组则聚焦于中国最重大的经济决策。这两大关键决策机构，都受中央政治局直接领导。事实上，中国的体制在一定程度上，已接近于法国等国采用的半总统制。
国家安全委员会和全面深化改革领导小组的设立，将使中国在政治制度上更加“名实相符”，更有利于政治稳定。这项改革同时也启动了一项政治理念上的突破。不应忽视的是，现代政党的概念，是一百多年前从西方输入中国的，但中共与西方国家的政党有本质区别。在西方，民族国家首先出现，然后政党作为一部分(parts)社会群体的代表登上政治舞台，这正是政党(party)的字面含义。但在中国，历史进程与西方恰好截然相反。中共在1921年成立，28年后，创建了中华人民共和国。从成立第一天开始，中共的政治观就是代表中国多阶层民众的利益。在革命时期和建国初期，中共主要以马列主义的阶级观为思想核心，把自己定位为无产阶级的先锋队。
随着中共在政治探索和执政实践中日渐成熟，其基因中的民族国家因素逐渐成了主流。对这一演变，十多年前，江泽民总书记予以总结并提出了“三个代表”理论。由此，中共与时俱进，发展包括民营企业家在内的新生力量入党，以充分代表中国社会的各个阶层和群体。在政治功能上，中共显然不同于西方的政党，而是更近似于全国性的文官共同体，正如中国历朝历代的文官士大夫共同体一样。中共宣布自己代表中华民族，而不是特定阶层或群体；作为一个执政组织，中共根据选贤任能的原则从全社会选拔人才。本届三中全会的改革，宣告中国正式摆脱了苏联式的“三驾马车”模式的影响，将党和政府在结构上融为一体 。这一改革是一次历史性跨越，标志着中共成功地将现代化导向和中国独特的文化遗产相融合，引领国家的政治制度走向日益成熟。
当下，世界上许多国家在政治上实行多党制，即政党作为不同利益集团的代表，通过竞选轮流坐庄。就历史趋势看，中国的治理模式很可能截然不同。中共正在发展为代表中国社会整体利益的执政组织，它与中国历朝历代的士大夫文官共同体有相似之处，然而其本质已经现代化。中国政治发展的未来，将取决于中共这一核心政治体制在制度上与时俱进，适应日新月异的中国社会的能力。
三中全会开启第三个三十年
在国内外的舆论中，“政治改革”一词基本被意识形态偏见所绑架。在这种语境中，“政治改革”被等同于西方式的民主化。不管多重大的变革，只要不是朝着多党竞争的选举制方向发展，就不会被承认是“政治改革”。这种观点不但肤浅，而且不利于世界了解中国。
很多人割裂中共领导中国的历史，声称中共64年的执政史可分为正反两个三十年，其中从1949年到1979年的前三十年，主要领导人是毛泽东；从1979年直到当下的后三十年，以邓小平的改革为起点。很多人认为，后三十年是对前三十年的背离甚至否定。但这是误读，尽管前三十年和后三十年在意识形态表达上对比鲜明，但在历史脉络上却是紧密相联的。正是在毛泽东领导的前三十年中，中国获得了民族独立，奇迹般地完成了工业和人力资源的基本积累，奠定了现代国家的基础。没有前三十年的积累，后三十年的改革开放便无法成功实施。
如果上述政治改革获得落实，十八届三中全会将成为第三个三十年的起点，并开创一个新的时代。未来的三十年将是以改革开放为节点的前两个三十年的辩证结合，以构成现代中国完整、独特的历史叙述。一个全新的现代政治模式正在成形，它不同于基于选举和多党轮替的西方式现代性民主，然而它的执政能力、灵活性、反馈民意的有效性、和权力制约的创新性将超越正落后于时代的现代性。
当下，治理危机正在全球溃疡。美国的两党恶性对立导致治理瘫痪，欧洲的精英官僚主义压制下的欧盟各国民众怨声载道，发达国家在政争泥潭中越陷越深，难以自拔。在许多发展中国家，从泰国到埃及，选举民主制陷入四面楚歌。
尽管面临无数挑战和考验，中国在发展经济、消除贫困、凝聚社会等许多领域的成就出类拔萃。在习近平总书记的任期内，中国将问鼎世界第一经济大国地位。在目前的发展势头下，到本世纪中叶，中国将在综合国力的各个方面成为真正的世界大国。中国从古老的文明中走来，其现代化的道路将为世界带来全新的视野和可能性。然而，如果中国找不到成熟稳定、适合国情的政治治理模式，上述潜力就只能是镜花水月。三中全会在政治治理上启动了大胆改革，其落实将为未来中国提供稳定的政治保障，为这个古老文明的复兴铺平道路。2013年11月，在北京召开的十八届三中全会，对世界的未来影响深远。
李世默是上海的风险投资家和政治学学者。
本文发表于最新一期《外交》杂志（《Foreign Affairs》），观察者网首发中文全文，点击下一页查看英文原文
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PARTY OF THE CENTURY
THE THIRD PLENUM BEGINS THE THIRD THIRTY-YEARS
By: Eric X. Li
In November 2013, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its much-anticipated Third Plenum of the Eighteenth Congress (the Third Plenum). Each third plenum usually sets the policy agenda for a new administration. Some project much longer-term impacts. More than 30 years ago, Deng Xiaoping famously launched his ground breaking economic reforms at the third plenum of the party’s eleventh congress. That meeting changed the trajectory of China and the world at large. After the transfer of power to a new generation of leaders at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2012, this Third Plenum offers the world the most concrete look at how General Secretary Xi Jinping plans to lead the world’s most significant ascending power.
Most analyses have focused on the wide-ranging economic reform agenda. To be sure, the economic policy measures announced are more sweeping than most people expected and, if implemented to any significant extent, are likely to usher in yet another era of sustained economic growth. They include initiatives that will drastically change the structure of the Chinese economy, such as hybrid ownership of state companies, reduced regulatory hurdles for commercial enterprises, greater control and transferability of land for rural residents, and liberalization of the financial sector, to name just a few.
Yet, the common narrative is that, just like reformers in the past, China’s new leadership has put forth substantial economic reforms but, again, held its ground, or even backtracked, on much hoped for political reforms. It is true that the centrality of the party’s leadership has been strengthened, not loosened. As a result, some have characterized it as “turning right on economics and left on politics”.
But such views are misplaced. The Third Plenum has launched significant, and in some cases unprecedented, political reforms that will fundamentally alter how the world’s largest nation is governed.
These institutional reformulations are taking place in three critical dimensions: substantial re-engineering of the relationship between central and local authorities, unprecedented restructuring of the party’s disciplinary inspection regime and the state’s legal system, and the most significant reorganization at the highest level of decision-making mechanism in the history of the People’s Republic that will redefine the relationship between the party and the state.
REBALANCING ACT
For centuries, one of the most vexing political problems of imperial China was the balance of power between central and local authorities. Many successes and failures of governance were direct results of how this relationship was managed. A healthy balance underwrote long periods of prosperity and stability. The opposite led to coups and counter-coups and sometimes the demise of dynasties.
Contemporary China is no exception. In its 64-year history, the party’s governance model in terms of central and local relations has gone through at least three phases. The first was Soviet-styled centralization between 1949 and 1956. Driven by the need to consolidate the newly established political power and resuscitate a long paralyzed and disparate economy, the party imported the model from the Soviet Union in which virtually all powers were centralized in Beijing. However, beginning in the late 1950’s, China’s founding leader Mao Zedong changed course and led the nation through a long period of devolution of power. He launched this dramatic turn-around with the publication of one of his most important treatises on Chinese governance, “On the Ten Imperative Relations”, in 1956. In it, Mao proposed an across-the-board decentralization of power from Beijing to provincial and local governments. According to him, such devolution was urgently needed to release the productive forces of the economy and revitalize local political initiative. This process intensified through the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970’s when tax collection, control of state owned enterprises, and even the management structure of the military were devolved to regional levels. The remnants of that period continued in the first phase of Deng Xiaoping’s reform era. In the eighties, the central government was at times so strapped for cash that it had to demand financial support from provincial capitals. Many characterize Mao as the ultimate centralizer of political power. Such views are gross over-simplifications.
It was not until the early 1990’s when the party began to rebalance this critical relationship between the central and the regional. Former Premier Zhu Rongji formalized this process in 1994 by shifting taxing authority back to Beijing. However, nearly three decades of decentralization was difficult to reverse. By the time of the Third Plenum, only half of the central government’s 20 trillion RMB annual tax collection was under the fiscal budget. The single standardized national budget that would unify revenue and spending announced in the Third Plenum is a most impactful re-engineering of the core of Chinese political governance in decades. Under this new system, the central government will assume nearly full authority on national spending. Administrative responsibilities are to be clearly delineated between Beijing and regional and local governments. Rules on transfer payments will be standardized. Direct monitoring and management of local government debts are now vested in central government ministries.
In the coming decade, many of these changes will prove critical to China’s long-term development blueprint. The new tax revenue management system and debt control mechanism will address the issues arisen from misallocation of resources driven by short-term and localized economic targets. With this rebalancing of power, the central government is now able to implement policies on a nationwide basis in pursuit of cross-generational national strategies. Urbanization tops the list. China plans to urbanize 13 million people a year over the next 20 years. The rural-urban divide and the large newly urbanized migrant population in limbo have long been persistent problems in China’s development model. By doubling its control over the purse string, Beijing will be able to manage allocation of national resources to expand the provision of public goods such as healthcare, welfare, and education that are pre-requisites for realizing the aggressive urbanization goals for the next phase.
The most widely reported item put forth at the Third Plenum was the principle that the market should be allowed to exercise a decisive force in the allocation of economic resources. Some have said that the rebalancing of political power to the center runs counter to that stated goal. But this assessment is contrary to realities on the ground. After more than thirty years of rapid economic development under a relatively decentralized framework, local protectionism and the lack of standardized rules that govern commercial activities are now hampering the further development of China’s market economy. Many companies use their alliances with local governments to block entry by competitors from other regions by political means. Disparate rules and regulations across provinces make it difficult for companies to operate outside their home territories. The centralization policies launched by the Third Plenum, not dissimilar to the waves of federalization during America’s industrialization process that propelled inter-state commerce, will drive the further scaling up of China’s vibrant market economy. In addition, positive externalities may also result from this trend. Environmental protection and food safety, for examples, will greatly benefit from the national standardization and enforcement of rules and regulations.
DISCIPLINE AND THE LAW
Widespread official corruption is a major challenge facing contemporary China’s political governance. Many have named corruption as the Achilles’ heel of a political system that has otherwise achieved undeniable successes. One of the main reasons for the party’s inability to contain corruption has been the existence of fundamental flaws in the intra-party discipline inspection regime and the state’s legal system.
How to check internal abuse of power has been a central issue for the CCP at the earliest stage of its development. The first internal inspection agency, then called the Central Inspection Commission, was established in 1927 when the party was barely six years old and 22 years before it actually gained political power. The system has gone through periods of irrelevance and effectiveness. It fell to virtual disuse during the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping re-established the current incarnation of the regime, called Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), at the all-important third plenum of the eleventh party congress in 1978.
From its origin in 1927 to the present, the party used the matrix structure borrowed from the Soviet Communist Party’s internal inspection organization. In name, the Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) at each level of government is under the DIC of the next highest level of government, and ultimately all under the CDIC. But in practice, they are appointed by and work under the party committee of the same level. For instance, the highest official of a county is the county party committee secretary. The head of the Discipline Inspection Commission of the county serves on that party committee under the authority of the party secretary and is almost always of a lower rank to him in the party’s hierarchy. Further more, almost all personnel, financial management, compensation and welfare of each DIC are controlled by the parallel party committee. This leads to the situation in which the person in charge of checking official corruption in a particular jurisdiction is under the influence and authority of, and sometimes owes his career to, the head of the officialdom he is tasked to discipline. This shortcoming might not have been so obvious when the governance system was relatively simple. But with the dramatic increase in the complexities of the country’s political system and its society in general this structural flaw is proving to be crippling to the party’s ability to govern.
Bo Xilai, the disgraced party secretary of Chongqing, was a member of the Politburo, China’s highest ruling body. But the head of Chongqing’s Discipline Inspection Commission was not even a member of the Central Committee, which placed him at least two levels below in ranking to Bo. Needless to say, such a regime, while workable in punishing low-level offenses, is weak in checking abuse of power at higher levels.
An unprecedented restructuring of this system occurred at the Third Plenum. The decision-making mechanism of the regime has been extracted from the nearly sixty-year-old matrix structure and remade into a vertical agency apart from the party committee composition. The Discipline Inspection Commission at each level of government remains inside the party committee system but its functions are now independent of the party committee of that jurisdiction. Each DIC is being placed under the direct control of the DIC at the next highest level of government and ultimately under the Central Discipline Inspection Commission in Beijing. The CDIC will now have full authority over appointments of officials at all DIC’s at all levels nationwide. The initiation and investigation of all cases by a DIC are to be conducted autonomously from the parallel party committee and held accountable to the next highest DIC. As if to demonstrate the immediate effect of this restructuring, at the closing of the Third Plenum Beijing appointed a new head of the Shanghai Discipline Inspection Commission, an official from the capital.
To mirror the reform of the party’s internal inspection regime, the state’s legal system is being similarly restructured. The court systems at each jurisdiction will be held accountable not to its parallel government but to the next highest court. It is widely anticipated that the system will be further reformed to establish cross-jurisdictional courts, setting it further apart from local and regional authorities.
One cannot overstate the significance of these reforms to China’s future governance. It is the most qualitative change in the distribution and provision of power for the party in decades. China is an extremely large country with a highly complex governance mechanism. The introduction of an independent authority as a watchdog at each and every level of government is a dramatic move. If fully implemented, the new system will play a decisive role in curbing corruption and generally improve the efficacy of governance.
PARTY AND STATE
The Third Plenum’s most noticeable reorganization of political structure came with the establishment of the National Security Committee (NSC) and the Central Reform Leading Group (CRLG). Both are directly under the authority of the Politburo and its standing committee and, therefore, above the State Council (equivalent of the cabinet). A review of the historical context can help understand the importance of this development.
In 1949 when the party established the People’s Republic, it borrowed what was called the “three-carriages” model from the Soviet Union. Corresponding to the USSR’s Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the Central Ministerial Conference, the CCP, in addition to its own party central committee, set up the National People’s Congress and the State Council. The former is the legislature let by a chairman and the latter is the cabinet run by the premier who is the head of government, and both are members of the Politburo’s standing committee. In recent decades, the General Secretary of the Party also serves as president who is the head of state. The “three carriages” are parallel in form. But the Constitution enshrines the centrality of the party’ s leadership of the whole nation.
This has created a level of institutional complexities that have periodically caused uncertainties in governance. The issue has been at times particularly acute in the relationship between the party and the State Council. Ever since the early days of the People’s Republic, periodical debates broke out about the degree of integration, or separation, between the party led by the Central Committee and its Politburo and the government run by the State Council. During the first 30 years under Mao, the “great helmsman” has been driven back and forth between being only the leader of the party while leaving the government to be run by separate institutions and asserting direct control over all national powers. Such institutional conflicts, combined with the varying characteristics of the personalities involved, were partially responsible for the disastrous Cultural Revolution.
Both constitutionally and practically, the party is the supreme political institution for the nation. Yet, the “three-carriages” governing model puts up a pretense of separation. This conceptual contradiction has remained a stubborn stumbling block in China’s political development. With the creation of the National Security Committee and the Central Reform Leading Group, the Third Plenum initiated the most significant departure from the old Soviet model. The party has now moved firmly to the front and center of political governance, further cementing its constitutional authority. The NSC’s responsibilities cover all aspects of China’s domestic and international security policies from the police force to the Foreign Ministry. The CRLG will spearhead the nation’s most strategic economic initiatives. Both are now under the firm control of the party’s Politburo. In a practical sense, the Chinese system has, in some respects, moved closer to the semi-presidential system employed by countries like France.
This brings China’s institutional conception closer to reality and will serve as an immensely stabilizing force in governance. It may also signal a potential political breakthrough. It is important to note that the idea of modern political parties was imported into China from the West more than a hundred years ago. But the CCP in essence is not the same as political parties in Western countries in which the establishment of the nation state came first and the parties materialized later to represent “parts” – as the term party means – of the population in the political system. What happened in modern China was the reverse. The party came into existence first and, after 28 years, it founded the People’s Republic. From day one, the CCP claimed to represent a plurality of the Chinese nation. That claim was checked by the party’s Marxist-Leninist heritage of being the vanguard of the proletariat.
However, as the party and the nation matured, the national dimension of its DNA has been prevailing. General Secretary Jiang Zemin began the articulation of this evolution with his “Theory of the Three Represents” more than ten years ago. It began the process of making the party represent cross sections of Chinese society and have since inducted new elements, including private business people, into the party ranks. In effect, like the centuries-old Mandarin class of the Chinese dynasties, the CCP is, and behaves as such, a governing organization, not a political party. Its claim of representation is of the entirety of the Chinese nation not certain sections of it, and its ranks are open to all who are qualified by merit. By formally ending the Soviet styled “three carriages” model and structurally infusing the party and government, the Third Plenum further advanced this process and marked an important inflection point for the party as a maturing governing institution that is both connected to China’s unique cultural heritage and unmistakably modern.
In the long run, China’s governance will likely be qualitatively different from the model currently employed by most countries in which multiple parties compete to represent different interest groups through elections. The CCP is evolving into a governing organization that would embody a plurality of Chinese society, not dissimilar to the centuries-old Mandarin class of the Chinese dynasties - although unmistakably modern. The future of Chinese political governance, then, will depend on the development of the CCP and its institutional capabilities to continue to adapt to a rapidly changing society.
THE THIRD THIRTY YEARS
When it comes to China, the term “political reform” has been ideologically hijacked. It is taken to mean Western styled democratization. Any changes that are not consistent with that end, no matter how significant, cannot be honored with the term “political reform”. Such views are immature, if not outright harmful, to the world’s understanding of China.
Many segregate the party’s leadership of the largest nation in the world into two thirty-year periods: the first was between 1949 and 1979 under Mao; the second was between 1979 and now, which began with Deng’s reforms. Some have characterized the second thirty-year period as a departure from or even a betrayal of the first. They are wrong. Although the first and second thirty years seemed to project starkly contrasting ideological outlooks, they are also symbiotic to each other. Without the national independence and the building of basic industrial and human infrastructures of a modern nation accomplished during the first thirty years under Mao, Deng’s reforms in the second thirty years would not have been possible.
This Third Plenum, if these political reforms are carried out, will begin a third thirty-year era that will dialectically combine the first two and bring into totality a unique modern Chinese narrative -- a model of governance not driven by elections yet is competent, responsive, agile, and with effective checks and balances.
Today, crises of governance are plaguing nations around the world. From America’s paralyzing partisanship to Europe’s byzantine elitism, the developed world is steeped in stagnating malaise. In much of the developing world, from Thailand to Egypt, electoral regimes are either failing to deliver or have altogether lost legitimacy.
Although facing myriad challenges and growing pains, China stands apart in so many dimensions – economic development, poverty alleviation, and general social cohesion, to name just a few. On Mr. Xi’s watch, China will become the world’s largest economy. At the current trajectory, by the middle of this century, it will become a true great power in all aspects of its national power. This ancient civilization’s modern success could bring the world fresh perspectives and new possibilities. But that potential could not be realized without a coherent and mature system of political governance suitable to the country. The daring political reforms unleashed at The Third Plenum, if successful, will cement China’s political governance for many generations to come and pave the way for the ancient civilization to at last reclaim its place among the nations of the world. What happened last November in Beijing, then, may prove to be more consequential than most people in the world have recognized.
Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist and political scientist in Shanghai.